Efficiency Loss of Mixed Equilibrium Associated with Altruistic Users and Logit-based Stochastic Users in Transportation Network

  • Xiao-Jun Yu Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang,Guizhou 550004, China
  • Chun-Hua Fang Hunan Institute of Science and Technology, xueyang, Hunan 414006, China
Keywords: efficiency loss, mixed equilibrium, variational inequality, system optimum, demand ratio,

Abstract

The efficiency loss of mixed equilibrium associated with two categories of users is investigated in this paper. The first category of users are altruistic users (AU) who have the same altruism coefficient and try to minimize their own perceived cost that assumed to be a linear combination of selfish com­ponent and altruistic component. The second category of us­ers are Logit-based stochastic users (LSU) who choose the route according to the Logit-based stochastic user equilib­rium (SUE) principle. The variational inequality (VI) model is used to formulate the mixed route choice behaviours associ­ated with AU and LSU. The efficiency loss caused by the two categories of users is analytically derived and the relations to some network parameters are discussed. The numerical tests validate our analytical results. Our result takes the re­sults in the existing literature as its special cases.

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Xiao-Jun Yu, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang,Guizhou 550004, China

a:School of Mathematics and Statistics

b: Guizhou Key Laboratory of Economic System Simulation

Chun-Hua Fang, Hunan Institute of Science and Technology, xueyang, Hunan 414006, China
School of Mathematics

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Published
2014-02-28
How to Cite
1.
Yu X-J, Fang C-H. Efficiency Loss of Mixed Equilibrium Associated with Altruistic Users and Logit-based Stochastic Users in Transportation Network. Promet [Internet]. 2014Feb.28 [cited 2024Mar.28];26(1):45-1. Available from: https://traffic.fpz.hr/index.php/PROMTT/article/view/718
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Articles